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IN THE SUPRE!1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELSA H. NIXDORF, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 
N. FREDERICK HICKEN and 
A. JAMES 11cALLISTER, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
No. 16151 
BRIEF OF 0 ESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action in which the 
plaintiff complains that a suturing needle was lost in her 
abdomen during an operation performed in 1964 and that 
the incident was not disclosed to her. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants 
at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the judgment. 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
The parties will be described as they appeared in 
the trial court. Defendants concede that this Court 
must review the evidence in the light most favorable 
to plaintiff, who has appealed from a directed verdict. 
This does not mean, however, that the Court should 
be asked to ignore undisputed facts favorable to the 
defendants (Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co. (1961), 
12 Utah 2d 278, 365 P.2d 788), nor is it proper to 
select portions of testimony on direct examination 
without considering the effect of cross-examination. 
As this Court said in Alvarado v. Tucker (1954), 2 Utah 2d 
16, 268 P. 2c 986: 
The rule is familiar that "testimony of a 
witness on his direct examination is no 
stronger than as modified or left by his 
further examination or by his cross-
examination. A particular part of his 
testimony may not be singled out to the 
exclusion of other parts of equal 
importance bearing on the subject." 
Since defendants believe that plaintiff's statement 
of facts does violence to the principles of the cited cases, 
and is also argumentative, defendants submit their own 
statement of facts: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff first sought treatment from Dr. Hicken, 
a specialist in surgery, on June 2, 1964, just before her 
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sixtieth birthday (R 128). For ten years the 
plaintiff had suffered from a condition of stretched, 
weakened and ruptured muscles in her pelvic diaphragm 
that support the internal organs in the abdominal 
cavity (R 129-30). The plaintiff's condition had 
progressed to such advanced stage that her uterus, 
bladder and rectum, unsupported by muscle tissues, 
had collapsed through the vagina (R 130-31). Portions 
of these organs had protruded through the vaginal opening 
and were hanging externally between the plaintiff's 
legs (R 130-31). She was admitted to the L.D.S. Hospital 
for surgery to return the organs to their proper places, 
to repair the heavy muscle structures that support them, 
and to excise portions of the cervix that had become 
inflammed by chafing and rubbing against her clothes and 
legs (R l38-39). 
The surgical procedure Dr. Hicken employed required 
him to enter the abdominal cavity through the vagina. 
The vagina was retracted to the extent possible to allow 
access and visibility to the area and a circular incision 
was made at the posterior end (R 149). After tissues 
that separate the vagina from the rectum were cut back, 
the bladder was repositioned in its proper place and 
muscle tissues were sutured together to secure the organ 
(R 196-97). Dr. Hicken then proceeded to the second 
stage of the operation in which he repositioned the 
-3-
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rectum and began suturing heavy muscle structures 
deep inside the abdominal cavity. 
Working through the vagina, Dr. Hicken positioned 
the rectum in its proper place and located the torn 
bundles oi muscle on each side of the structure that 
had to be sutured together to form a supportive sling 
(R 150). Since it is impossible to see the suturing 
needle while it is drawn through the tissue and since 
in many of these areas the surgeon is required to rely 
solely on his sense of touch, special instruments were 
used to facilitate the manipulation of needles and 
sutures (R 137). 
Dr. Hicken testified that the s~all, curved suturing 
needles were threaded by a surgical nurse and clamped 
in needle forceps which were then handed to the surgeon 
(R 137). By manipulating the forceps, the needle is placed 
through muscle tissue and rotated until the point pro-
trudes sufficiently to be grasped by a hemostat (R 159). 
The surgeon then uses the hemostat to pull the needle and 
suture through the tissue. The suture is then cut and 
the needle which is still secured by the hemostat is 
handed to the surgical nurse and the process is repeated 
(R 159). Once sutur~s have been placed on both sides of 
-4-
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the torn muscles, the sutures are drawn together, tied and 
the ends of the muscles are sewn together around the 
rectum (R 159). 
While Dr. Hicken was using the needle forceps to 
insert and rotate the needle through muscle tissue, the 
needle slipped from the forceps and was lost (R 217). 
The forceps were still locked when Dr. Hicken withdrew 
the instrument without the needle (R 220). Dr. Hicken 
explained the loss as follows: 
A You are getting a bite of tissue --
you are corning down and getting a 
bite of tissue -- you see, here's a 
rachet that locks it. I showed you 
yesterday. Now, when you are sewing, 
you do not have your fingers in these 
openings of the ratchet. You take 
your hand out and put it against the 
palm here using this finger to 
give you a little force and a directional 
mechanism for the point of the needle and 
you come around like this. Now, sometimes 
you hit heavy muscles, sometimes you have 
thinner muscles, sometimes you have scar 
tissue. If the bladder and things have 
been out too long, that tissue has been 
irritated and there is a lot of scar 
tissue until you get some resistance in 
bringing the needle through and it's 
very easy for the -- possible that the 
needle, being in oil and blood and fatty 
tissue down there, too, that the needle 
could rotate and slip out. When we bring 
the needle -- when we brought the needle 
holder out it was still locked and the 
needle wasn't in it so that's why you 
assume that the needle was broken or lost. 
Q Do you have any opinion as to whether it 
came off because of the fats and blood 
and oil from the tissues or from some 
other reason? 
-5-
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A No, I think it's -- the oil and the blood 
lubricates it and makes it easier to 
rotate out and the fact we had heavy 
tissue to work with and all of these 
caused the needle to rotate and slip 
(R 220-21). 
Dr. Hicken palpated muscle tissues in the area of 
the operative site, but he was unable to locate the 
needle (R 221). Further efforts were not undertaken because 
in those days, X-ray equipment was in the basement of the 
hospital and was not available in the operating room, 
because Dr. Hicken did not wish to prolong the procedure 
in view of the plaintiff's age and health and because 
he knew that a needle left in the muscles in this area 
would not be harmful to the patient (R 214). 
Dr. Hicken reported the loss of the needle in the 
operative report which became part of the hospital chart 
of the patient's care, but decided against alarming the 
plaintiff by advising her of its presence. Dr. Hicken 
testified that he considered several factors in making 
the decision. First, he did not expect the needle to 
cause any physical harm inasmuch as its presence would 
be as innocuous as metal surgical clips that are often 
used instead of sutures in the abdominal area (R 214). 
Second, in Dr. Hicken's judgment, the plaintiff was an 
emotional, nervous and worrisome individual who might 
become unduly alarmed,particularly in view of her limited 
understanding of the English language which made it diffi-
cult for her to comprehend medical problems (R 222). 
-6-
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Finally, the plaintiff was hypertensive and an unreasonable 
concern about the condition would be expected to elevate 
her blood pressure even higher (R 222). In short, no 
purpose beneficial to the patient would have been served 
by such a disclosure and the information could have been 
detrimental to the patient's mental and physical health 
(R 222-23). 
Although the plaintiff testified that she has suffered 
pain in her abdomen and in her back that the attributes 
to the needle, no expert testimony was offered to show 
that the needle proximately caused any damage. To the 
contrary, the plaintiff's present physician, Dr. Robert 
Maddock, testified that the pain in her abdomen was 
secondary to a kidney stone in the right ureter (R 168). 
He also believes that the needle was not responsible for 
the plaintiff's back pain (R 185). Dr. Maddock testified 
that it is medically probable that the needle is encapsulated 
by surrounding tissue that prevents the needle from moving 
and causing any harm or discomfort (R 181). Dr. Maddock 
discovered the needle during X-ray tests performed in 
August, 1976, and while conducting a pelvic examination 
he subsequently identified a smooth nodule that contains 
the needle between the vagina and the rectum (R 170, 175). 
He testified that the plaintiff exhibited no pain response 
whatsoever when he and his consulting surgeon probed the 
-7-
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area in which the needle is located (R 180). He 
recommended that the needle not be removed since the 
chances of its causing any damage were "very remote" 
(R 183), and his consulting surgeon concurred. 
At the close of the~aintiff's evidence, the trial 
court concluded that Dr. Hicken's explanation of the 
circumstances under which the needle was lost rebutted 
any inference of negligence and, in the absence of expert 
testimony showing a breach of the standard of care, the 
plaintiff had failed to prove negligence. The court also 
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove that 
the needle was the proximate cause of any damage. For 
those reasons, defendants' motion for directed verdict was 
granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE ISSUE 
OF NEGLIGENCE 
The plaintiff alleges that Dr. Hicken breached his 
duty to exercise ordinary care during ~he operation in 
two ways. First, although the precise reason why the 
suturing needle was lost remains unknown, she claims the 
fact that it was lost is sufficiently indicative of 
negligence to submit the issue to the jury on the basis 
of res ipsa loquitur. Second, the plaintiff complains 
-8-
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that Dr. Hicken negligently failed to undertake addi-
tiona! measures to locate the needle before concluding 
the surgery. No expert testimony was offered in support 
of either contention. 
This Court has recognized that under limited cir-
cumstances and upon sufficient evidentiary foundation, 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may apply to medical 
care. Talbot v. Dr. W. H. Groves' Latter Day Saints 
Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872 (1968). The Court 
has correctly recognized, however, that the doctrine 
must be cautiously applied especially in the field of 
medicine where untoward consequences may occur despite 
the highest degree of skill, care and attention. The 
Court stated in Joseph v. W. H. Groves' Latter Day Saints 
Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960): 
It is recognized that res ipsa loquitur 
has been applied in various field where 
an injury occurs which is not to be 
expected if proper standards of care 
and skill are observed. But this is done 
only with caution, particularly in the 
medical field because of the realization 
that many aspects of the treatment of 
human ills cannot be regarded as exact 
science and a bad result may obtain even 
though recognized standards of care and 
skill are employed. 348 P.2d at 938 
(Emphasis added.) 
As a foundational requirement for the application of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff was required 
-9-
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to show more than the mere fact that the suturing needle 
became detached from the forceps during the operation. 
Rather, the plaintiff had the burden of proving that 
such an event would probably not have occurred if Dr. 
Hicken had observed proper standards of care and skill. 
In Talbot, the Court emphasized this foundational 
requirement as follows: 
The fact that plaintiff's disability 
resulted from an uncommon or rare 
occurrence does not relieve him of 
the burden of establishing causation. 
An inference of negligence cannot be 
permitted solely upon the basis that 
the plaintiff developed a rare complica-
tion while undergoing medical and surgi-
cal treatment. The doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur has no application unless 
it can be shown from past experience 
that the occurrence causing the dis 
ability is more likely the result of 
negligence than some other cause. 440 
P.2d at 873 (Emphasis added.) 
Whether the trial court was justified in refusing to 
submit the case on the theory of res ipsa loquitur accordingly 
requires consideration of two issues: First, was the 
occurrence more likely the result of ne9ligence than 
some other cause; and second, was the defendant's 
conduct in relation to the occurrence explained in such 
a manner as to preclude any reasonable finding of 
negligence on his part. Joseph v. W. H. Groves' Latter 
Day Saints Hospital, supra, at 937; Talbot v. W. H. 
Groves' Latter Day Saints Hospital, supra, at 873. 
-10-
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In the present case, the plaintiff offered no 
evidence of any kind that the first event complained 
of, i.e., detachment of the suturing needle from 
the forceps, was more probably than not the result of 
negligence. Dr. Hicken's choice of the surgical techni-
que that required use of special instruments to suture 
heavy muscles deep in the abdominal cavity was never 
challenged. The plaintiff also offered no evidence that 
the suturing instruments and needles Dr. Hicken selected 
and, more importantly, the technique he employed in using 
them failed in any way to conform to the standard of 
care required of him. It was undisputed that Dr. Hicken 
was unable to visualize all of the areas in which sutures 
were made (R 138), that the tissues through which he had 
to draw the needle were thick, often scarred and resistant 
to penetration (R 220-21), and that Dr. Hicken had to 
rely solely upon the suturing forceps that were lubri-
cated with blood and body fats and oils to secure and 
manipulate the needle (R 220-21). 
Under these circumstances, the trial court was 
compelled to find and properly held that it was not within 
the common knowledge of laymen to say that loss of the 
needle necessarily implied negligence or lack of due 
care on the part of Dr. Hicken. The trial court's ruling 
is consistent with a number of decisions where appellate 
-11-
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courts have considered similar fact situations. 
In Tomei v. Henning, 62 Ca. Rptr. 9 431 P.2d 633 (1967), 
cited with approval by the Utah Court in Talbot, the 
California Supreme Court considered a malpractice action 
against a physician who accidentally sutured the right 
ureter of a patient in two places during a hysterectomy. 
The Court stated: 
Since the question whether, in the light 
of past experience, the accident in this 
case was probably the result of negligence 
is not a matter of common knowledge among 
laymen, expert testimony is necessary to 
determine whether a probability of 
negligence appears from the happening of 
the accident. 431 P.2d at 635. 
In Steinmetz v. Humphrey, 289 Ky. 709, 160 S.W.2d 6 
(1942), the Court affirwed a directed verdict in favor 
of a physician who was charged with malpractice because 
two surgical needles were broken and lost in the wound 
during an operation. The Court held that expert medical 
testimony was necessary to establish sufficient foundation 
for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and in 
doing so distinguished cases where surgical sponges and other 
materials are inadvertently not removed from an incision at 
the conclusion of an operation. Similarly, in Hohenthal v. 
Smith, 114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940), the Court affirmed 
a directed verdict in favor of a physician in a broken 
needle case. The Court held that expert testimony was 
necessary to establish sufficient foundation to apply the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and stated: 
-12-
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We cannot say as matter of law that the 
mere leaving of the needle in the 
patient's body under the circumstances 
shown by the evidence was sufficient 
to sustain a verdict of negligence . . 
114 F.2d at 497. 
The plaintiff also failed to offer any evidence that 
the standard of care applicable to Dr. Hicken in 1964 
required use of X-ray equipment or other means to locate 
the needle after he had palpated muscle tissues in the 
area of the operative site. Dr. Hicken testified that 
15 years ago X-ray equipment was kept in the basement of 
the hospital and, in his medical judgment, prolonging the 
procedure while equipment was brought to the operating room 
would have created an unnecessary risk to the plaintiff 
who was elderly and not in the best physical cc~dition. 
The propriety of Dr. Hicken's decision under these cir-
cumstances is clearly not within the common knowledge of 
laymen and the trial court correctly so held. Cf. 
Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940); 
Steinmetz v. Humphrey, 289 Ky. 709, 160 S.W.2d 6 (1942); 
Emery v. Fisher, 148 A. 677 (Me. 1930). As this Court 
stated in Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 
1108 (1959): 
In the absence of a standard of care 
established by expert medical testimony 
and some evidence showing a deviation 
from this standard, it must be presumed 
that the physician skillfully operated 
on and treated the plaintiff. To allow 
the question of negligence to be submitted 
-13-
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to the jury without first establishing 
a standard of care would allow a jury 
to indulge in a type of speculation 
not generally allowed. 347 P.2d at 1111. 
Even if the loss of the suturing needle and Dr. 
Hicken's failure to recover it give rise to an inference 
of negligence, the trial court correctly held that Dr. 
Hicken's explanation of the events precluded any 
reasonable finding of negligence on his part. Dr. 
Hicken testified that the forceps were still in a locked 
position when he withdrew the instrument without the 
needle (R 220). In view of that uncontradicted fact, 
the plaintiff's speculation that Dr. Hicken might have 
prematurely released the needle by opening the forceps is 
both illogical and contrary to the evidence. The fact 
that Dr. Hicken was attempting to insert the needle through 
heavy and resistant muscle tissue with an instrument that 
was lubricated with blood and body fats and oils makes 
his explanation of the loss the only reasonable conclusion. 
Since there is no suggestion in the evidence that there 
were any precautions against the loss which Dr. Hicken might 
have employed while using the forceps, any inference of 
negligence disappears. See, e.g., Joseph v. W. H. Groves' 
Latter Day Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 
(1960). In a closely analogous case, Justice Roscoe Pound 
in Benson v. Dean, 232 N.Y. 52, 133 N.E. 125 (1921), stated 
the rule as follows: 
-14-
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Common sense suggests that the condition 
discovered by Dr. Saphir was incompatible 
with successful surgery and medical treat-
ment. But when the evidence of the defen-
dant's surgeons carne into the case with a 
reasonable explanation showing what may 
happen when the proper degree of care and 
skill is actually exercised, the possible 
inference of negligence from the breaking 
of the needle alone was driven out and the 
jury should have been so instructed. The 
rule res ipsa loquitur put upon the 
defendant the burden of going on with the 
case, but in the absence of medical evidence 
to the contrary, it must be assumed on this 
appeal that the breaking of the needle 
was not due to negligence. 232 N.Y. at 58 
(Citations omitted). 
Since the plaintiff failed to present sufficient 
evidence to submit the case to the jury on the issue of 
negligence, the trial court properly granted the defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict in their favor. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
EXERCISED APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT IN NOT ADVISING THE 
PLAINTIFF OF THE PRESENCE OF THE NEEDLE. 
All courts recognize "the physician's duty to reveal 
to the patient that which in his best interest it is 
important that he should know." Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary 
& Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The 
physician's primary duty, however, is to do what is best for 
the patient. For that reason, the courts uniformly recognize 
an exception to the duty of disclosure in cases where 
sound medical judgment indicates that disclosure would 
be detrimental to the patient's welfare. 
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In Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 473 P.2d 116 
(1970), the Court affirmed a motion to dismiss an 
action against a physician who had not disclosed known 
risks attendant to a diagnostic surgical procedure 
The defendant testified that he thought full disclosure 
would not be in the patient's best medical interest in 
view of the following psychological conditions as related 
by the attending physician: 
This man was very well-educated, a fine 
man, but, in addition, he was very 
frightened about his condition, he was 
apprehensive, and this actually guided 
our hand in much of what we did because 
if a man has a serious heart disease, 
with hypertension, and you thereupon 
frighten him further, you have a problem 
which you have created. 473 P.2d at 
120. 
The Court recognized that the doctrine of informed consent 
imposes upon a physician a duty to disclose to the patient 
all relevant information concerning a proposed treatment, 
but stated: 
However, the doctrine recognizes that the 
primary duty of a physician is to do what 
is best for his patient and that a 
physician may withhold disclosure of 
information regarding any untoward conse-
quences of a treatment where full disclosure 
will be detrimental to the patient's total 
care and best interest. Id. at 119. 
The Court held that a dismissal was proper because the 
medical standard, as established by the defendant's 
testimony, was that a competent and responsible medical 
-16-
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practitionerwould not disclose information which 
might induce an adverse psychosomatic reaction in a 
patient highly apprehensive of his condition. 
Similarly, in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 
(D.C. Cir. 1972), the Court recognized an exception to 
the duty of disclosure when risk-disclosure poses such a 
threat of detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible 
or contraindicated from a medical point of view. The 
Court stated: 
It is recognized that patients occasionally 
become so ill or emotionally distraught 
on disclosure as to foreclose a rational 
decision, or complicate or hinder the 
treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological 
damage to the patient. Where that is so, 
the cases have generally held that the 
physician is armed with a privilege to 
keep the information from the patient, and 
we think it clear that portents of that type 
may justify the physician in action he deems 
medically warranted. The critical inquiry is 
whether the physician responded to a sound 
medical judgment that communication of the 
risk information would present a threat to 
the patient's well-being. 464 F.2d at 789. 
(Citations omitted.) 
An exception to the duty of disclosure has been 
recognized and applied in cases where foreign objects were 
left in the patient's body. See, e.g., Hohenthal v. Smith, 
114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Mandelbaum v. Weil, 208 
App. Div. 409, 203 N.Y.S. 289 (1924); VanSkike v. Potter, 
53 Neb. 28, 73 N.W. 295 (1897). 
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The Utah legislature has specifically recognized 
such an exception to a physician's duty of disclosure. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides that it 
shall be a defense to any action against a physician 
based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent 
if: 
The health care provider, after considering 
all of the attendant facts and circumstances, 
used reasonable discretion as to the manner 
and extent to which risks were disclosed, 
if the health care provider reasonably 
believed that additional disclosures could 
be expected to have a substantial and adverse 
effect on the patient's condition. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-14-5 (2) (d) (1953). 
In the present case, the trial court correctly 
held that reasonable minds could not conclude that the 
defendants were negligent in deciding against alarming 
the plaintiff by advising her of the presence of the 
surgical needle. All of the physicians who testified 
at trial agreed that the presence of the needle was not 
har~ful to the plaintiff and that any attempt to remove 
it was not recommended. Dr. Hicken's judgment that the 
plaintiff was an emotional, nervous and worrisome individual 
who might become unduly alarmed by knowledge of the presence 
of the needle was clearly proven correct by the plaintiff's 
own testimony. Although all of the physicians testified 
that the needle could not have been the cause of any pain 
or discomfort, the plaintiff testified: 
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Q Now, since you found out about the 
needle, have you been worried more 
and upset more? 
A Oh, yes, I guess you worry. You have 
to -- you have to watch it. So if I 
watch it then the pain-- I don't move 
then its not too bad, but when it moves, 
I've got it. I'm telling you, I got it. 
I feel it. 
Q Have you been upset all the time ever 
since you found out? 
A Well, I think I'm nervous, awful nervous. 
(R 251-52) 
Finally, the testimony is undisputed that the 
plaintiff was hypertensive and that adverse psychosomatic 
reactions and unreasonable concern about the condition 
would be expected to further elevate her blood pressure. 
Dr. Hicken's undisputed testimony may properly be 
considered expert medical testimony that establishes the 
medical standard with respect to disclosure that is 
applicable to this case. The medical standard so established 
is that a competent and responsible medical practitioner 
should not disclose information which might induce an 
adverse psychosomatic or physiologic reaction in a highly 
apprehensive patient. Dr. Hicken's judgment in abiding 
to that standard is beyond reproach under the facts 
presented in this case. 
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POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANTS' 
CONDUCT PROXIMATELY CAUSED ANY DAMAGES 
Plaintiff not only failed to produce sufficient 
evidence of negligence or other breach of duty but 
she also failed to prove that the conduct complained 
of proximately caused any harm. 
In Jackson v. Colston, 11 Utah 295, 209 P.2d 566 
(1949), the Court considered an action in which the 
plaintiff alleged she had received burns to her leg while 
undergoing weight-reducing treatments administered by the 
defendants. Affirming a directed verdict in favor of 
the defendants, the Court found it unnecessary to determine 
whether the coctrine of res ipsa loquitur should have been 
applied because the plaintiff had failed to show any causal 
connection between the negligence and the injury complained 
of. Stating that it is fundamental that the burden rests 
upon the plaintiff to establish the causal connection 
between the injury and the alleged negligence of the 
defendant, the Court stated: 
In a proper case, the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur may relieve the patient or-fh_e __ _ 
duty of showing specific acts of negligence, 
but the authorities unanimously hold that 
the causal connection between the alleged 
negligent act and the injury ~s never pre-
sumed and that this is a matter the pla~ntiff 
~s always requ~red to prove affirmatively. 
Res ipsa loquitur is limited to the question 
of whether the defendant was negligent - it 
has nothing to do with the element of causa-
tion. 209 P.2d at 568. (Emphasis added.) 
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Similarly, in Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 
310 P.2d 523 (1957), the Court affirmed the action 
of the trial court which set aside a verdict for 
plaintiff and dismissed the plaintiff's action. In 
that case, the plaintiff failed to introduce expert 
testimony to establish the standard of care required 
of the defendant and to establish a causal connection 
between the conduct and injury complained of. After 
ruling that expert testimony was necessary to prove 
negligence, the Court held: 
Similar principles likewise apply to the 
proximate causation of the injuries alleged. 
As a general rule in a malpractice action, 
expert testimony must be produced to show 
that the injuries alleged were probably 
caused by the lack of due care of defendan~. 
In the absence of such evidence, there is 
nothing upon which a jury can base its 
finding on the proximate cause of the injury. 
The evidence must be substantial and must, 
in cases of this complex type, have founda-
tion in expert medical testimony. 310 P.2d 
at 526. (Citations omitted.) 
In order to reach the jury, the plaintiff was required 
to prove with a reasonable medical probability that the 
conditions of abdominal and back pain of which she com-
plained were the result of the needle and not some other 
cause. Testimony that the needle "might have" or "could 
have" caused harm is insufficient. Denny v. St. Mark's 
Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968). 
In the present case, the record is devoid of any 
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evidence that the presence of the surgical needle 
proximately caused the injuries and damage of which 
the plaintiff complained. To the contrary, the evidence 
is undisputed that the presence of the needle is not 
harmful to the plaintiff and could not be the cause 
of any damage to her. Dr. Hicken testified: 
[F]rom my experience in such cases and 
from being very conversant with litera-
ture on this subject, as I was a professor 
and a teacher in medical schools, I knew 
that a needle left in this particular 
area was not particularly harmful to the 
patient. It is common knowledge that we 
leave metal in the pelvis area very fre-
quently. Now, for example, in some of 
our operations instead of using sutures 
and ties to tie around bleeding blood 
vessels, we have an instrument that we 
go in there and we put a metal clip on the 
blood vessel because it is easier to do, 
it's quicker to do and it is innocuous. 
(R 214) 
Dr. A. James McAllister offered similar testimony in 
answer to questions asked by the plaintiff's attorney: 
Q . . . a needle in the abdomen of a 
patient is not trivial, is it? 
A Yes, I think in this case it is. 
Q Oh. Oh, well, I see. 
A I think it is no different than a 
Michael's clip or these staples that 
we put through the bowel today to do 
the actual anastomoses of the intestines 
with. These staples are made out of 
the same material and they are sharp. 
Q Do you leave the points exposed? 
A Some of them. 
-22-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q On these clips? 
A Some of them. 
Q Are they capable of producing pain in a 
patient? 
A Interestingly, sharp objects usually do 
not produce pain in patient's abdomens. 
There is a different nerve supply in the 
-- within the abdomen and in the pelvis 
than there is in the surface of the body. 
They respond more to pressure than to 
sharpness. (R 233-34) 
The plaintiff's present physician, Dr. Robert Maddock, 
further testified that the abdominal pain of which the 
plaintiff complained was secondary to a kidney stone 
and was unrelated to the presence of the needle (R 168). 
The kidney stone problem was subsequently resolved and the 
plaintiff expressed no other complaints of abdominal pain 
(R 178). Dr. Maddock also concluded that the needle was 
probably not responsible for the plaintiff's back pa~n 
(R 185). His judgments were confirmed when the plaintiff 
exhibited no pain response at all to a probe of the needle 
conducted during a pelvic examination Dr. Maddock subse-
quently performed (R 180). In Dr. Maddock's judgment, the 
needle is totally encapsulated and it is medically probable 
that the needle will never move (R 182). 
Finally, it was also established at trial that Dr. 
Hicken's failure to inform the plaintiff of the presence 
of the needle was inconsequential because all of the 
physicians advised against any attempt to remove it. 
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Dr. Robert Maddock and another consulting surgeon both 
concluded that any surgery to remove the needle 
would be dangerous because of its location between the 
bladder and the rectum and, moreover, the chances of 
the needle causing any damage were "very remote." 
(R 183.) 
In summary, all of the physicians who testified 
at trial are in complete agreement that the needle has 
not caused the plaintiff any harm and that it is medically 
probable that it will cause no harm in the future. In 
light of such undisputed evidence, the trial court cor-
rectly held that there was nothing upon which a jury 
could base its finding on the pro~inate cause of any 
injury to the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly held that the plaintiff 
failed to prove foundational facts necessary to submit 
the case to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. 
Particularly in light of Dr. Hicken's explanation, the 
trial court was compelled to hold that the question of 
whether detachment of the needle from the forceps during 
a surgical procedure of the kind performed on the plain-
tiff necessarily implies negligence is not a matter of 
common knowledge among laymen. In the absence of expert 
testimony to support the plaintiff's contention, no 
evidence existed to sustain the verdict of negligence. 
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Each of the physicians who testified at trial 
also supported Dr. Hicken's judgment in deciding not 
to disclose the presence of the needle to the plaintiff. 
The incident was properly reported in the operative 
report that became a part of the patient's medical 
record, but no purpose beneficial to the patient would 
have been served by further disclosures. The evidence 
was undisputed that no responsible medical practitioner 
would have disclosed the incident to the plaintiff at 
the risk of inducing severe and adverse psychosomatic 
or physiologic reactions. 
Finally, the trial court correctly held that no 
evidence had been presented upon which the jury could 
base a finding that the defendants' conduct proximately 
caused any harm. To the contrary, the testimony is 
undisputed that the needle could not have caused the 
ailments of which the plaintiff complained and that its 
presence is as innocuous as metal staples that are now 
commonly used in place of sutures. The plaintiff's 
physicians testified that the needle should not be removed 
and that it is medically probable that it will never cause 
any future harm. 
For these reasons, the defendants respectfully urge 
the Court to affirm the judgment of the Court below. 
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DATED June 12, 1979. 
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